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SHORT SUMMARY 
 
• This is a joint project of SITE (Stockholm), CEFIR (Moscow), IET (Moscow), STCSR 
(Kiev), CASE-Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek), and CASE-Poland (Warsaw). 
• In each round of the survey, the project teams collected unique data on ownership, 
corporate governance and investments for about 1000 Russian, 1100-1200 Ukrainian and 
300 Kyrgyz medium- and large-size enterprises. 
• The three countries feature a lot of similarities in their corporate governance practices. 
However, Russian firms are the worst and Ukrainian firms are the best in terms of 
corporate governance, with Kyrgyz firms lagging slightly behind their Ukrainian 
counterparts. 
• There were no significant changes in corporate governance and ownership patterns in any 
country over the year between the two rounds. 
• The main determinants of corporate governance are size, legal form, and the ownership 
structure. Larger firms and open joint-stock companies (OAO) practice better governance 
in all countries. However, the effects of ownership differ qualitatively across countries. 
• We did not find any link between corporate governance and either need for investment or 
actual investment. This is consistent with the respondents’ perception that facilitating 
access to capital markets is not among primary goals of corporate governance. There is a 
weak link between investment and the ownership structure. 
• There is some evidence of the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control in 
Russia (takeover threats make firms improve corporate governance). There is also some 
evidence that takeovers lead to a more efficient reallocation of assets in Kyrgyzstan 
(worse performing firms are more likely to be taken over). 
• The results of the project both have scientific value and can be used for policy advice. 
The scientific value of the results consists of improving our knowledge and understanding 
of functioning of institutions of corporate governance in transition economies. On the 
basis of our results policy recommendations for improving corporate governance 
practices in Russia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan can be developed. The main policy 
recommendation for all countries is to improve minority shareholder protection, 
legislation and legal enforcement, necessary for preventing and resolving corporate 
conflicts. Another important recommendation concerns developing financial markets 
through better regulatory oversight and more efficient infrastructure. This would make 
raising funds from the public more attractive, and, hence, would create more benefits 
from practicing good corporate governance. Methodology for measuring the quality of 
corporate governance that has been developed during the project can be now used to 
construct indices of corporate governance at both country level and firm level. 
 
DETAILS OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
• Analysis of the data obtained from the surveys has shown that the three countries feature 
a lot of similarities in terms of firms’ ownership structures, corporate governance 
practices and investment patterns. At the same time, there are a few important differences 
suggesting that country-specific factors do matter for companies’ choices. 
• There were little changes in ownership, the overall quality of corporate governance and 
investment patterns from 2005 to 2006. Table 7 gives an impression that in Russia the 
quality of corporate governance somewhat dropped over the year, but our regression 
analysis did not show any statistically significant decrease. 
• Ownership structure and control turnover 
- In all three countries most companies have concentrated ownership structure, with 
large stakes belonging to insiders and large outside shareholders (table 2). 
- A fair number of firms changed the largest shareholder, with Russia having the highest 
turnover rate (table 3). As a rule these were friendly takeovers, though often they led to 
CEO replacements (table 4). 
- The share of management and the share of all small shareholders tend to decrease with 
the firm size, while the share of the largest outside shareholder and the government’s 
share tend to increase with the firm size (figure 2). 
• Companies’ perception of problems of corporate governance. 
- Inadequacy of legislation is considered the main problem by respondents in all 
countries, but its importance is especially high in Ukraine. Weak minority shareholder 
protection is also very important in all countries, while poor quality of judicial system 
is considerably important only in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (table 5). These results give 
an idea on which aspects of the legal system reforms in each country should focus. 
- Many Russian and Ukrainian respondents are of opinion that the main problems of 
their national industries lie beyond corporate governance, implying that Russian and 
Ukrainian policymakers should devote substantial attention to other aspects of business 
environment as well (e.g. taxation or regulation). 
• Companies’ perception of goals of corporate governance. 
- In all countries a significant number of companies perceive corporate governance goals 
as complex ones that combine improvements in the internal decision-making process, 
their image to outsiders, and the need to comply with the legal requirements (table 6). 
- Facilitating access to capital markets is not among primary concerns, which is 
consistent with the data on investment (table 9) showing that a very small percentage of 
firms rely on public capital markets (stock and bonds) for attracting external funds. 
- Strangely, prevention and resolution of corporate conflicts is a rather rarely mentioned 
goal of corporate governance. 
• Corporate governance practices and their determinants. 
To keep the number of respondents in the samples large enough, an index of corporate 
governance (CGI) was constructed on the basis of six questions, typed in red in table 7. For 
additional analysis various alternative indices were tried as well. 
- Intra-country variations in the corporate governance practices are substantial (figure3). 
As figure 4 shows, in all three countries larger firms are more likely to adopt the norms 
of good governance. Open joint-stock companies (OAO) practice better governance 
than firms of other legal forms. (Results on size and legal form are confirmed by the 
regression analysis, in which we controlled for other factors). 
- Table 7 gives an impression that Ukrainian firms practice the best corporate 
governance, while Kyrgyz firms – the worst. However, when we control for the firm 
size, Kyrgyz firms become better than Russian ones, though still somewhat worse than 
Ukrainian firms (figure 4). For very large firms (here we can only compare Russia and 
Ukraine) corporate governance quality is similar irrespective of the country. 
To better analyze determinants of corporate governance, we have done regression 
analyses for each country separately (as well as jointly for Russian and Ukraine). Our CGI as 
well as various alternative indices were regressed on ownership variables, size, group 
affiliation, industry and control turnover variables. We tried various specifications. 
Representative examples of our regressions for the three countries are in tables 10a-c. 
- Dispersed ownership (share of all shareholders having less than 5% of shares) 
positively affects corporate governance. It does not follow, however, that the effect of 
ownership concentration is straightforward. In Russia managers’, largest outside 
shareholder’s and government’s shares have an inverted U-shape effect on corporate 
governance with the maximum at 30-50%, though the effect of the managerial 
ownership is not very strong. In Ukraine large outsider ownership has no effect, and the 
effect of state ownership is mainly negative and concave, while the effect of 
managerial ownership has an inverted U-shape, but is much more pronounced than in 
Russia. In Kyrgyzstan shares of all mentioned types of large shareholders (including 
government) have mainly either a negative (albeit nonlinear) or U-shape effect. 
- These differences suggest that managers and controlling shareholders have different 
incentives to practice good corporate governance in the three countries. Why we 
observe such differences is puzzling and needs further investigation. 
- Neither need for outside funds nor industry did appear to affect corporate governance. 
• Determinants of investment. 
- Our regression analysis has shown that investments, whether overall or external, are 
not affected by corporate governance in either country (not reported in the appendix).  
This is consistent with the respondents’ perception that facilitating access to financial 
markets is not a primary goal of corporate governance (table 6). 
- There is generally a weak link between investment and ownership structure (not 
reported in the appendix). In Russia, managerial ownership positively affects 
investment, while in Kyrgyzstan it seems to positively affect outside investment. State 
ownership has a negative impact on outside investment in Russia and Ukraine. 
• Efficiency of the market for corporate control. 
Our regression analysis has provided some evidence, albeit rather weak, that the market 
for corporate control works toward more efficient redistribution of assets and greater 
managers/controlling owners’ discipline (not reported in the appendix): 
- In Russia, hostile takeover threats lead to a greater improvement of corporate 
governance, and, in turn, improvements in corporate governance lead to fewer takeover 
threats. This result suggest the presence of a discipline effect of takeovers in Russia 
- More profitable firms are less likely to be taken over in Kyrgyzstan, which provides 
some evidence of efficiency of the assets reallocation. 
 
 
ANNEXES 
 
Description of the samples. 
In each of the two rounds of the surveys about 1000 Russian, 1100-1200 Ukrainian and 
300 Kyrgyz medium- and large-size enterprises were surveyed. The number of firms in each 
round was roughly the same, and roughly 75-90% the first round respondents participated in 
the second round. 
As a result, the teams obtained data on ownership, corporate governance and investments 
for the majority of the surveyed firms. Though Russian firms are somewhat bigger than 
Ukrainian ones and substantially bigger than Kyrgyz ones, this difference should be 
attributed to the natural difference in the size of companies in the countries’ industries and, 
thus, in terms of representativeness the samples are similar. 
Most of the companies are medium or large size enterprises, but not very large: less than 
15% of enterprises in each country are listed. A majority of the firms are open joint-stock 
companies (OAO). Most firms are not parts of business groups. 
 
Figure 1a. Sample structure of Russian and Ukrainian firms by size in 2006. 
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Figure 1b. Sample structure of Kyrgyz firms by size in 2006. 
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Table 1. Firms’ characteristics in 2006 (figures were similar in 2005). 
As a percentage of firms for which 
the data were available 
Legal form 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Open joint-stock company (OAO) 74 69 66 
Closed joint-stock company (ZAO) 24 31 11 
Other 2 0 23 
Number of companies 981 1103 306 
As a percentage of respondents who 
answered this question 
Is your company a part of a 
business group? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Yes 31 18 11 
No 69 82 89 
Number of companies answered 981 780 306 
As a percentage of respondents who 
answered this question 
Is the company listed? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Yes 7 14 9 
No 93 86 91 
Number of companies answered 569 710 286 
 
Table 2. Ownership structure in 2006 (figures were similar in 2005). 
Mean percentage share on the sample of 
respondents who answered this questionnaire 
What actual percentage of shares in your 
firm do you think is owned by: 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Management 22 16 34 
Largest outside (non-state) shareholder 35 42 26 
All small (below 5%) shareholders 16 22 20 
Government 9 6 15 
Number of companies answered 666 587 254 
As a percentage of respondents who answered this 
questionnaire 
What is the type of the largest 
outside shareholder in your 
company? Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Domestic individual 42 34 55 
Domestic legal entity 56 48 25 
Foreign individual 1 4 8 
Foreign legal entity 4 16 12 
Number of companies answered 588 551 215 
 
Figure 2a. Ownership structure and firm size in 2006. Russia. 
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Figure 2b. Ownership structure and firm size in 2006. Ukraine. 
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Figure 2c. Ownership structure and firm size in 2006. Kyrgyzstan. 
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Table 3. Control turnover 
As a percentage of respondents who 
answered this question 
Was there a change of the largest 
shareholder or appearance of a new 
large shareholder in 2004-2005? Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Yes 22 15 14 
No 78 85 86 
Number of companies answered 749 731 277 
 
Table 4. Hostility of changes in corporate control 
As a percentage of companies 
where change of the largest 
shareholder occurred 
Was the appearance of the new largest 
shareholder a result of a hostile or friendly 
takeover? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Hostile takeover 13 4 - 
Friendly takeover 87 96 100 
Number of companies answered 125 97 35 
As a percentage of companies 
where change of the largest 
shareholder occurred 
Did the appearance of the new largest 
shareholder entail involvement of a court? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Yes 10 7 15 
No 90 93 85 
Number of companies answered 130 105 39 
As a percentage of companies 
where change of the largest 
shareholder occurred 
Was the CEO replaced as a result of a change 
of the largest shareholder? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Yes 34 43 69 
No 66 57 31 
Number of companies answered 138 106 39 
Table 5. Companies’ perception of the most sensitive problems of corporate governance 
in their country in 2006 (figures were similar in 2005) 
As a percentage of respondents 
who answered this question 
Which corporate governance problems do you 
think are currently the most sensitive in 
Russian industry? Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
weak protection of small shareholders 37 30 41 
weak protection of large shareholders 10 4 17 
insufficient control over managers’ operation 19 4 16 
failure by companies to meet information 
disclosure requirements 9 2 9 
inadequate competence of the members of the 
board of directors 14 3 15 
inadequate protection of creditor rights 8 6 10 
inadequacy of current legislation (laws on 
companies, on bankruptcies, etc.) 39 58 48 
weakness of the judicial system in settling 
corporate disputes 25 14 26 
other corporate governance problems 6 9 8 
main problems of Russian/Ukrainian/Kygryz 
industry go beyond corporate governance 39 35 9 
Number of companies answered 664 666 190 
 
Table 6. Respondents’ perception of the goals of corporate governance in 2006 (figures 
were similar in 2005) 
As a percentage of respondents 
who answered this question 
Which goals in your opinion corporate 
governance serves achieving in your company? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Raising the effectiveness of the decision making 
process 66 66 62 
Facilitating access to domestic and international 
capital markets 10 10 32 
Raising company’s reputation 44 25 51 
Prevention and (or) resolution of corporate 
conflicts 14 11 16 
Conducting business in compliance with the law 41 42 38 
Other 2 1 2 
Corporate governance does not serve achieving 
any goals in our company 8 8 11 
Number of companies answered 672 693 199 
 
Table 7. Corporate governance practices of companies. 
Questions in “red” were used in the creation of the Corporate Governance Index (CGI). For each question, 
answers that correspond to the best practice among the three countries are highlighted in yellow. Similarly, 
worst practices are highlighted in black. For the questions concerning board practices, calculations were made 
on the sample of firms that have a board directors. 
Percentage of “yes” answers in the sample of respondents who 
answered the corresponding question 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Corporate Governance 
Practices. 
Shareholder rights and 
board structure. 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Do you have A 
SHAREHOLDERS 
DEPARTMENT? 
40 35 36 34 17 23 
Do you supply AGENDA of 
general shareholders meeting 
to all of your shareholders? 
88 80 96 96 88 77 
Is your shareholders’ register 
maintained by an 
INDEPENDENT 
REGISTRAR? 
79 74 90 90 69 63 
Are there INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS on the board of 
directors of your company? 
46 43 56 55 27 25 
Are there 
REPRESENTATIVES OF 
MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS on the 
board of directors? 
29 24 61 60 49 43 
Are there FORMAL 
COMMITTEES (audit, 
remuneration, nomination) on 
your board of directors? 
9 7 16 18 5 6 
Do you use 
INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS (US GAAP/ 
IAS)? 
9 9 31 30 49 61 
Are your annual reports 
audited by an 
INDEPENDENT 
AUDITOR? 
93 91 95 99 71 75 
Number of companies 
answered 562-720 654-721 667-915 534-859 252-291 281-298 
 
 Figure 3. Index of corporate governance (CGI) in 2006. Histograms and sample means. 
CGI is computed on the basis of six questions highlighted in red in table 7. Only firms that have a board of 
directors were considered for this graph.  CGI takes values from 0 to 6. For each firm, a value of 1 was assigned 
to an answer if it was “yes” and 0 if it was “no”. The value of CGI for each firm was obtained by adding up the 
answers to all six questions.  
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Figure 4. Index of corporate governance (CGI) as a function of firm size in 2006. 
Only firms that have a board of directors were considered for this graph. 
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Table 8. State involvement in 2006 (figures were similar in 2005). 
As a percentage of respondents who answered this question (and 
who have a board of directors for the second question) 
 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
What actual percentage of 
shares do you think is 
owned by the government? 
9 6 15 
Number of companies who 
answered this question 666 587 254 
yes no yes no yes no Do you have government 
representatives on board? 29 71 8 92 14 86 
Number of companies 
answered this question 640 674 175 
 
 
Table 9. Investment in 2005 (figures were similar in 2005). 
As a percentage of respondents 
who answered this question 
What were your company’s investment finance 
sources in the past (2005) year? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
There was no investment 14 30 48 
Own funds 78 65 41 
Bank loans 31 23 12 
Owner’s funds 11 5 1 
Budget and non-budget funds 3 0 1 
New bond issue 0 0 9 
New share issue 1 2 1 
Other 3 1 8 
Number of companies answered 776 696 269 
As a percentage of respondents 
who answered this question 
What is the maximum interest rate at which 
your company would take a bank loan? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
No need 32 30 37 
3-6% 51 55 47 
7-10% 15 12 11 
11-20% 2 3 4 
Number of companies answered 747 706 254 
As a percentage of respondents 
who answered this question 
Does your company plan to raise external 
finance for investment in the next 3 years? 
Russia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Yes 49 37 48 
No 51 63 52 
Number of companies answered 645 567 237 
 
Table 10a. Determinants of corporate governance in Russia. OLS cross-sectional 
regressions using the data from both rounds. The dependent variable is the index of 
corporate governance (CGI), based on the six questions. The first principle component is 
used instead of a simple sum. Own_man is the managerial share, own_out is the share of the 
largest outsider, own_state is the share of the government, own_minor is the share of all 
shareholders who hold below 5% of shares, x_sq is the corresponding share squared. When 
running regressions all ownership shares were expressed as shares of 1 rather than in 
percentage terms. Profitable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has reported 
positive profit in the last year, and zero otherwise. Group is a group affiliation dummy. 
Emplx_y are dummies that equal one if a number of employees in a firm lies between x and y. 
OAO is a dummy that equals one if a firm is an open joint-stock company, and zero 
otherwise. y2006 is a year dummy. Change_own is a dummy that equals one if a firm 
reported a change in the largest owners in the last year, and zero otherwise. Hostile_take is a 
dummy that equals one if a firm reported a hostile takeover in the last year, and zero 
otherwise. Friend_take is a similar dummy for friendly takeover. Chown_chdir and 
chown_court are similar dummies indicating if a takeover was associated with a change of 
CEO and court involvement respectively. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 CGI_pc1 CGI_pc1 CGI_pc1 CGI_pc1 CGI_pc1 
own_man 1.120* 1.148* 1.115* 1.023* 1.195** 
own_man_sq -1.021 -1.130* -1.113 -1.070 -1.188* 
own_out 1.686*** 1.660*** 1.687*** 1.674*** 1.761*** 
own_out_sq -2.012*** -1.963*** -2.002*** -2.044*** -2.121*** 
own_state 2.490*** 2.414*** 2.402*** 2.364*** 2.378*** 
own_state_sq -3.738*** -3.403*** -3.507*** -3.413*** -3.365*** 
own_minor 0.855*** 0.848*** 0.830*** 0.767*** 0.829*** 
Profitable -0.072 -0.069 -0.078 -0.075 -0.055 
Group 0.071 0.018 -0.008 0.026 0.034 
Empl200_500 -0.146 -0.147 -0.144 -0.182 -0.164 
Empl500_1000 0.353** 0.390*** 0.396*** 0.389*** 0.371*** 
Empl1000_2000 0.444*** 0.528*** 0.547*** 0.564*** 0.527*** 
Empl2000_5000 0.878*** 0.970*** 1.019*** 0.942*** 0.946*** 
Empl5000_ 0.800*** 0.844*** 0.933*** 0.807*** 0.818*** 
OAO 0.388*** 0.335*** 0.305** 0.303** 0.327*** 
y2006 0.116 0.100 0.094 0.117 0.097 
industry dummies Not siginificant 
change_own  0.070  0.099 -0.014 
hostile_take   0.438*   
chown_chdir     0.211 
chown_court    0.154  
friend_take   -0.041   
Constant -1.227*** -1.213*** -1.218*** -1.127*** -1.194*** 
Observations 747 713 683 694 701 
R-squared 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 
Table 10b. Determinants of corporate governance in Ukraine. OLS cross-sectional 
regressions using the data from both rounds. The notation is the same as in table 10a. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 cgind_pc1 cgind_pc1 cgind_pc1 cgind_pc1 cgind_pc1 
own_man 1.554*** 1.916*** 1.793*** 1.902*** 1.910*** 
own_man_sq -1.963*** -2.493*** -2.409*** -2.484*** -2.473*** 
own_out 0.329 0.205 0.112 0.199 0.201 
own_out_sq -0.124 0.053 0.128 0.064 0.076 
own_state 1.205 0.913 0.924 0.911 0.945 
own_state_sq -2.285** -1.846* -1.892* -1.843* -1.874* 
own_minor 0.658*** 0.565*** 0.545*** 0.568*** 0.582*** 
profitable 0.025 -0.029 -0.021 -0.027 -0.031 
group 0.239* 0.210 0.196 0.196 0.199 
empl200_500 0.086 0.101 0.113 0.103 0.100 
empl500_1000 0.203* 0.169 0.184 0.172 0.166 
empl1000_2000 0.401*** 0.444*** 0.485*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 
empl2000_5000 0.257 0.149 0.171 0.155 0.165 
empl5000_ -0.287 -0.289 -0.273 -0.299 -0.265 
OAO 0.494*** 0.497*** 0.484*** 0.489*** 0.491*** 
y2006 0.023 0.013 0.017 0.019 0.020 
industry dummies Mostly not significant 
change_own  -0.006  0.004 0.055 
hostile_take   0.561*   
chown_chdir     -0.121 
chown_court    0.152  
friend_take   -0.059   
Constant -0.487* -0.508* -0.471 -0.505* -0.521* 
Observations 724 647 641 646 646 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 
 
Table 10c. Determinants of corporate governance in Kyrgyzstan. OLS cross-sectional 
regressions using the data from both rounds. The notation is the same as in table 10a, 
except that due to a more detailed employment data, logarithm of employment (log_empl) 
was used instead of employment dummies. Due to the small sample size and substantial 
homogeneity across firms in terms of industry affiliation, industry dummies were not 
controlled for. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 CGI_pc1 CGI_pc1 CGI_pc1 CGI_pc1 CGI_pc1 
own_man -2.665*** -2.725*** -2.824*** -2.666*** -2.717*** 
own_man_sq 2.441** 2.458** 2.579** 2.453** 2.489** 
own_out 1.414 1.411 1.468 1.421 1.427 
own_out_sq -1.927** -1.936** -1.942** -1.898** -1.890** 
own_state -1.531 -1.604 -1.690 -1.627 -1.570 
own_state_sq 1.074 1.057 1.253 1.203 1.022 
own_minor 1.906* 1.915* 2.072* 2.000* 1.927* 
profitable 0.156 0.144 0.138 0.156 0.120 
group 0.168 0.184 0.212 0.185 0.204 
log_empl 0.190*** 0.202*** 0.180*** 0.188*** 0.208*** 
OAO 0.922*** 0.884*** 0.935*** 0.892*** 0.898*** 
y2006 0.074 0.079 0.060 0.062 0.094 
change_own  -0.100    
hostile_take   1.180***   
chown_chdir     -0.260 
chown_court    0.251  
Constant -1.698*** -1.656*** -1.646*** -1.673*** -1.707*** 
Observations 274 271 262 269 271 
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
 
 
